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TRUSTS
Gerald LeVan*
PROHIBITED SUBSTITUTIONS

In Succession of Materiste,' a testamentary disposition in trust
narrowly survived condemnation as a prohibited substitution. The
will left certain immovable property to a bank trustee, naming as
income beneficiaries the testatrix' mother, her eleven brothers and
sisters and also naming certain successor and contingent income beneficiaries. Without identifying the principal beneficiaries as such, the
will nevertheless provided that, at termination of the trust, ten percent of the corpus should be distributed to a church, 45 percent to
certain named income beneficiaries and the remaining 45 percent
among the descendants of my brothers and sisters by root. If any
of my brothers or sisters does not leave descendants, then that
portion shall go to the descendants by roots of the brothers and
sisters who do leave descendants.'
The trial court held that the quoted disposition created a prohibited
substitution in that it provided for a possible shifting of principal
interests subsequent to the creation of the trust.3 However, in order
to salvage the disposition, the trial court exercised its power to sever
the objectionable shifting provisions as is allowed by section 2251 of
the Trust Code.' On appeal, the First Circuit speaking through Judge
Crain took a more limited (and more charitable) view towards the
quoted provision holding, in effect, that the shifting provision applied
only in the event an intended principal beneficiary should die in the
interval between the execution of the will and the testatrix' death and
thus constituted no more than a vulgar substitution expressly permitted by article 1521 of the Civil Code.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 273 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 619.

3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1520. Section 1972 of the Trust Code provides that upon a
principal beneficiary's death his interest vests in his heirs or legatees except as to class
trusts. Since no class trust was involved, the attempted shifting of principal after the
creation of the trust would constitute a prohibited substitution. Crichton v. Succession
of Gredler, 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (1970).

4. "If a provision in the trust instrument is invalid for any reason, the intended
trust does not fail, unless the invalid provision cannot be separated from the other
provisions without defeating the purpose of the trust." LA. R.S. 9:2251 (Supp. 1964).
5. The disposition by which a third person is called to take the gift, the inheritance or the legacy, in case the donee, the heir or the legatee does not take it, shall
not be considered a prohibited substitution and shall be valid.
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The net result is the same whether one follows the reasoning of
the First Circuit or the severance approach taken by the trial court.
Indeed, one wonders whether either approach would have succeeded
had writs to the supreme court been applied for. The quoted disposition is similar in many respects to the one stricken in Crichton v.
Succession of Gredler, since, at least arguably, it could operate to
"shift" or "suspend" the vesting of principal until the termination of
the trust. Moreover, in Crichton, the majority indicated that the
severance provisions were inapplicable to dispositions taking effect
only upon the termination of the trust. The result in Materiste,
whether obtained by the severance route or by narrow construction
of the quoted language appears consistent with the spirit the Trust
Code, and, in particular, with section 1724 requiring that the Trust
Code "shall be accorded a liberal construction in favor of freedom of
disposition." One hopes that the supreme court will take the same
view when presented with similar issues.
INVASION OF PRINCIPAL

Succession of Kaufman7 is primarily concerned with the imposition of the Louisiana inheritance tax upon various beneficiaries of a
testamentary trust. Mrs. Kaufman was survived by her husband, her
only child, a daughter, and the daughter's three children. Her will
placed her entire estate, consisting both of community and separate
property, in a trust naming the three grandchildren as principal beneficiaries, her husband as income beneficiary to the extent of 85 percent of the income and her daughter as income beneficiary of the
remaining 15 percent.' The will further purported to empower the
trustee to invade principal to the extent
deemed advisable to carefor my husband, limited only by the law
protecting the legitime of my daughter, and, after my husband's
death to the extent deemed advisable to care for my daughter?
For some years, Louisiana courts have consistently held that the
"legal usufruct" of the surviving spouse, over the decedent's share of
the former community property granted by article 916 of the Civil
6. 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (1970).
7. 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). Several commentators have already
expressed their views as to the tax result. See Comment, 34 LA. L. REv. 46 (1973); L.
OPPENHEIM AND M. NATHAN, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 270, p. 405-07 (1973); New
Developments in the Law, 21 LA. B.J. 55, 56 (1973).
8. Successor and contingent beneficiaries were also named.
9. Succession of Kaufman, 270 So. 2d 471, 472 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (Emphasis
added.)
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Code, has its origin in the marriage contract."' For this reason, such
legal usufruct is not acquired by an inheritance and thus is not property subject to the inheritance tax." The same is true when such
usufruct is "confirmed" by the will of the decedent spouse in community. 2 A similar result obtains where the surviving spouse receives
an equivalent income interest in trust in lieu of the legal usufruct.'
A principal issue in Kaufman was the extent to which the surviving
spouse's income interest was equivalent to a legal usufruct and thus
exempt from the inheritance tax. To the extent Mr. Kaufman was
entitled to income from his wife's separate property there was no
equivalency and thus no exemption, since the legal usufruct does not
attach to the separate property of the decedent spouse. Accordingly,
any inheritance tax exemption would apply only to his 85 percent
interest in the income from trust property belonging to the community. The value of this income interest would have been exempt
from the tax but for a power of invasion granted to the trustee. 4
In Succession of Lindsey and again in Succession of Bellinger,",
it was held that the income beneficiary in whose favor the power of
invasion is reserved is chargeable with the inheritance tax not only
on the value of his income interest but upon the value of all of the
property subject to invasion, as though such invasion were a legal
certainty. The Kaufman court was satisfied that the Trust Code' 7
prohibited invasion of that portion of the community property which
10. Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907).
11. LA. R.S. 47:2404 (1950). See also In re Stelly's Estate, 185 So. 637 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1939).
12. See Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932). There, the will
provided that the usufruct would not be forfeited upon the spouse's remarriage. The
court indicated that continuation beyond remarriage does not subject the usufruct to
inheritance tax. In Kaufman, there is no indication that any of Mr. Kaufman's income
interest was to terminate upon remarriage. Assuming this is the case, his income
interest was more than or other than the equivalent of a legal usufruct and thus
arguably a testamentary usufruct. If testamentary, then it would be subject to the
inheritance tax. The recent decision of the supreme court in Succession of Chauvin,
260 La. 828, 257 So. 2d 422 (1972) may add support to this view. See especially, Justice
Tate's concurring opinion where he mentions the "unfortunate results" of the majority's rationale "such as (even though the widow never remarries in fact) estate
[inheritance? tax consequences (since the widow receives the usufruct by will, not
by law) ....
" Id. at 428 (Emphasis added.)
13. Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), writ refused,
255 La. 279, 230 So. 2d 587 (1970).
14. The court did not consider the factor of continuation beyond remarriage. See
note 12 supra.
15. 179 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
16. Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
17. LA. R.S. 9:1847 (Supp. 1964).
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constituted legitime and thus exempted from taxation the value of
Mr. Kaufman's 85 percent income interest over that portion of the
trust property. However, following Bellinger, the court held that the
exemption did not apply to the value of his 85 percent income interest
over the disposable portion of the former community property because such income interest was not the equivalent of legal usufruct.
The marital contract did not establish the trustee's power to invade
the disposable portion of the community property for Mr. Kaufman's
benefit; rather such power was created by his widow's testament and
the anticipated benefits from the exercise of such power constituted
an "inheritance." It was the existence of a power of invasion which
lost him the exemption and it is at this point where the court seems
to have erred.
True, Mrs. Kaufman's will purported to invest the trustee with
a power to invade trust principal on Mr. Kaufman's behalf. However,
the invasion clause was insufficient. Section 2068 of the Trust Code
provides that, except as regards the legitime trust:
the trust instrument may direct or permit a trustee to pay...
principal from the trust property to an income beneficiary for
support, maintenance, education, medical expenses, or welfare
under objective standards set forth in the trust instrument, even
though the payment impairs the interest of another beneficiary.",
No such objective standards are found in the Kaufman will. Rather,
the trustee was empowered to invade whenever "deemed advisable to
care for my husband [or daughter] . . .,,"
Her executor sought to convince the court that invasion was so
unlikely that the mere existence of the trustee's power to invade
should have no bearing on the valuation of the income interest. That
argument was rejected in Kaufman as it had been rejected earlier in
Bellinger. However, a seemingly sound alternative argument would
be that for want of objective standards the power of invasion could
not be exercised by the trustee. Accordingly, since no community
property was subject to invasion in his favor, his income interest
thereon was exempt from taxation. Similarly, since none of his wife's
separate property was subject to invasion, only the actuarial value of
his income interest therein was subject to Louisiana inheritance tax.
18. LA. R.S. 9:2068 (Supp. 1964) (Emphasis added.)
19. Succession of Kaufman, 274 So. 2d 471, 472 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (Empha-

sis added.)
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TRUSTEE'S DUTY OF LOYALTY

Section 2082 of the Trust Code obligates the trustee to administer the trust "solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Two cases
construing the duty of loyalty were decided during this past term. In
Martinez v. Alto Employees' Trust, "' an employee sued the trustee
of a corporate retirement plan alleging that, upon termination of his
employment, he had become entitled to a lump sum payment representing approximately 75 percent of his share in the plan. At the time
he was first employed, the plan provided for such payment within 60
days after termination of employment. Subsequently, the plan was
amended to give the trustees the discretion to withhold such distribution until the employees "normal retirement date" as defined by the
plan. Mr. Martinez' employment was terminated subsequent to that
amendment. When he thereafter demanded a lump sum payment of
his share, the trustees refused on the ground that the amended plan
permitted them to withhold the funds until his normal retirement
date.
The evidence disclosed that the plan was self-administered and
that the three trustees were the president of the employer corporation
and his two sons, both of whom were also corporate officers."'
The plaintiff established that the trustees had uniformly honored all past requests for lump sum distributions from other employees whose employment was severed after the amendment to the plan
discussed above. At the time of severance, Mr. Martinez had been
employed by the company for twelve years and his account was the
largest of any employee. It also appeared that he left his employment
in order to go into competition with his former employer in the same
line of business. There was testimony tending to establish that the
trustees' sole reason for denying the lump sum distribution was to
avoid, in effect the financing of a future competitor. Faced with these
facts, the court had no difficulty in finding that the trustees had
breached their duty of loyalty to their former employee-beneficiary
and thus distribution of his account was ordered.
The federal tax law imposes adverse tax consequences upon employers who discriminate against their employees in the course of
administering a pension, profit-sharing or other employee benefit
plans.2" The Martinez case should serve as a reminder that the Louis20. 273 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 277 So. 2d 675 (La. 1973).
21. Apparently a significant portion of the trust property consisted of purchase
money notes acquired by the corporation in connection with trailer sales and thereafter
negotiated to the trustees.
22. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 401(a), (e). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.4015, 1.401-12(f).
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iana Trust Code applies to all such trusteed plans and provides its
own set of rules and remedies for those against whom such discrimination is practiced.
REMOVAL OF THE TRUSTEE FOR CAUSE

Section 1789 of the Trust Code provides that a trustee may be
removed by the proper court "for sufficient cause shown." What constitutes "sufficient cause" is not defined. This provision was tested
by the Fourth Circuit in Succession of Supple. 3 Mrs. Supple's will
created a trust naming her nephew as sole principal and income
beneficiary and the Whitney National Bank of New Orleans as trustee. The principal trust property consisted of 20 percent of the outstanding shares of a closely held corporation whose principal corporate asset was a large sugar plantation. Prior to 1971, declining profits
convinced all of the stockholders that the plantation should be sold
and the corporation liquidated. However, the stockholders were divided as to an acceptable price. Current management, represented by
the owners of 40 percent of the stock, were of the opinion that the
plantation was worth in excess of $5,000,000; the owners of the remaining 40 percent (the non-management stockholders) thought that
the corporation should accept an existing bona fide offer for
$2,500,000 cash. 24 It was thus left to the corporate trustee to decide,
by voting for or against continuation of present management,
whether the offer would be accepted. At stockholders' meetings in
1971 and 1972 the trustee voted with management, effectively blocking the sale and liquidation of the company. Prior to both of these
meetings, the beneficiary had urged the trustee to vote for the sale.
The trustee's refusal to follow the beneficiary's wishes, coupled with
the trustee's reputed relationship with the management group was
alleged as "sufficient cause" for its removal. Specifically, it was
argued that the trustee had breached the trust by retaining the corporate stock which yielded very little income. 25 Further, it was contended that the trustee prevented the sale and liquidation in order
to retain the corporation's substantial commercial account and was
thus guilty of self-dealing. This, the plaintiff failed to prove.
23. 274 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
24. Had the offer been accepted, the trustee would have received $500,000 for its
shares. At six percent yield, this amount would have generated trust income of $30,000
per year, which the trustee was obligated to distribute. Dividend income from the
shares had been less than $2,000 per year. Of course, had an offer of $5,000,000 been
secured, the trust's share, $1,000,000 might have been worth waiting for. The court
noted that tax considerations might favor waiting for a higher offer.
25. See note 24 supra.
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Prior to both the 1971 and 1972 stockholders' meetings, bank
trust officers had assured him that the trust's stock would be voted
against continuation of present management and thus in favor of the
sale. Despite these assurances, a representative of the trust department attended the 1971 meeting and, under instructions from the
bank's chairman of the board, voted to continue present management. At that meeting the stockholders appointed a committee to
pursue the sale of the plantation. Alleging that the committee was
inactive, the beneficiary thereafter pressed for the sale of the plantation or, alternatively, for the sale of the stock held in trust. He was
advised that the trustee could not sell his stock without an appropriate court order and such order could not issue in absence of a bona
fide offer. Undaunted, he persuaded a trust officer to execute a proxy
in favor of the beneficiary's nominees to vote at the 1972 meeting.
Again the bank's board chairman intervened and caused the proxy
to be revoked and took steps to postpone the annual meeting. A large
certificate of deposit was purchased by the corporation on the same
day the proxy was revoked but the court was not convinced that these
events were connected. Later, the beneficiary's attorney requested
the bank to resign as trustee, but it refused. Shortly thereafter, the
1972 stockholder's meeting was held and again the trustee voted to
continue present management.
Having eliminated self-dealing as an issue in the case, it remained to determine whether or not the trustee's actions constituted
"sufficient cause" for removal. Unfortunately, the court added little
meat to the "bare bones" concept of "sufficient cause":
With the evidence before us, we cannot view the Whitney
vote as inept or ill-advised. The bank supports present management who voted to explore the possibilities of selling their assets
at a higher price than that offered by Burton. We make this
observation because plaintiff has argued the Whitney has taken
an irresponsible position in administering its finances. Under
LSA-R.S. 9:1789, we think a trustee should be removed if the
trust estate is obviously being mismanaged, whether there is or
is not a conflict of interest. However, the record discloses no
evidence of mismanagement but merely a conflict of opinion between the trustee and the beneficiary. 2
Grounds for discharge of a fiduciary are articulated elsewhere in
the law27 and there is a considerable body of authority outside Louis26. Succession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790, 794 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (Emphasis
added.)
27. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4234 (removal of tutor for cause).
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iana dealing with the discharge of a trustee for cause. In most instances, a breach of the trust must be proven although not every breach
constitutes sufficient cause for removal. On the other hand, mere
disagreement or unpleasant personal relations between the trustee
and the beneficiary are usually insufficient. As is noted by Professor
Bogert:
the settlor has entrusted the management to the trustee and not
to the beneficiary. The very fact that he created a trust showed
that he did not want the beneficiary to be the controlling factor
in the management of the property."
In some circumstances, the hostile relations between the trustee and
the beneficiary have resulted in the appointment of a new trustee,
particularly where the trustee engages in malicious or vindictive conduct. It appears that the court was aware of these considerations
which are reflected in its concluding statement:
The plaintiffs animosity towards this trustee is understandable in view of the fact that the bank has reversed its position on
several occasions. This has happened because the chairman of
the board has overruled the decision of junior trust officers. As a
consequence, plaintiff has been caused inconvenience and embarrassment. While we find the bank's conduct and attitude toward
the trust beneficiary less than commendable from a public relations standpoint, we cannot conclude the bank has breached the
fudiciary duty entrusted to it by Mary Eloise Supple in her last
29
will and testament.
On the facts as outlined in the opinion it appears that the legal result
is correct although the trustee clearly lost on the public relations
issue. The Supple case should be required reading for all who deal in
that sensitive area of trustee-beneficiary relations.
ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES-ATTORNEY'S FEES

Short mention should be made of Hughes v. Burguieres" which
involved the allocation of attorney's fees in connection with an alleged penalty clause which provided for the forfeiture of the interest
of any beneficiary who should assert any claim against the settlor's
estate, or attack his will in any respect, or contest the management
28. G. BOGERT,

LAW OF TRUSTS § 160 (1973).
29. Succession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790, 794 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).

30. 276 So. 2d 267 (La. 1973).
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of the family corporation.' The beneficiary of one of twenty-six identical testamentary trusts instituted a stockholder's derivative action
against the family corporation to enjoin certain action on the part of
its directors and stockholders. The court of appeal held that such suit
did not violate the penalty clause of the will but assessed the plaintiff's trust with all the attorney's fees and court costs. Writs were
granted only on the narrow issue of whether the plaintiff should bear
all of the attorney's fees and court costs or whether they should be
allocated among all twenty-six trusts. Noting that the beneficiaries
of all trusts were parties to the litigation and that all of their trusts
would be affected by its outcome, the supreme court allocated the
attorney's fees and costs among all twenty-six trusts. The result ap32
pears to be both equitable and correct.
31. See L. OPPENHEIN AND M. NATHAN, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 129, p. 254
(1973) (discussion of penalty clauses).
32. The court applied the Trust Estates Law since the will antedated enactment
of the Trust Code. Section 2101(B) of the Trust Estates Law and section 2156 of the
Trust Code provide for allocation of attorney's fees as between income and principal
but not as between two or more trusts with an interest in the outcome of the litigation
which are managed by the same trustee.

